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Introduction
Iceland was for a short while in 2008 the poster-child of the global financial crisis, when 
it emerged that its highly leveraged financial sector could not be bailed out by the Central 
Bank of Iceland (Seðlabanki Íslands). Deep scrutiny, both domestically and internation-
ally, of how this had come to pass followed. The erection of capital controls, the ejection 
of government, public refusal to settle the Icesave issue and the progressive settlement of 
the costs of (partial) rebalancing of the economy brought further attention. In roughly a 
hundred years, Iceland had gone from being a poor Danish colony to one of the most 
affluent countries in the world. The excesses permitted by the finance-dominated growth 
model (cf. Stockhammer 2008) in the run-up to the crisis aside, this ‘rags to riches’ story 
is commonly attributed to Iceland’s gaining control of its economy after Independence 
in 1944. Nationalist discourse was also highly influential in the development of the 
finance-dominated growth model in the 1990s and early 2000s. It persisted, albeit as a 
defence of the same model, as the latter came under scrutiny before its collapse in 
October 2008. It is, against this background ironic – or perhaps in a sense logical – to 
find dominant accounts of the Icelandic political economy and the crisis arising from the 
neo-mercantilist or neo-developmentalist tradition (from here on, ‘neo-mercantilist’) 
(e.g. Wade 2009; Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir 2010).1 It reproduces the nationalism on 
which the ‘Icelandic tragedy’ is founded. Drawing on Marxist critiques of this tradition, 
particularly with reference to the capitalist state, alienation, technology and methodo-
logical nationalism, we critique these interventions. We employ two sets of literature. 
First, we employ the Marxist critique of the methodological nationalism inherent in the 
neo-mercantilist tradition (esp. Pradella 2014). Second, we briefly return to the so-called 
‘Innis debate’ raging between leftist Canadian political economists in the 1980s, in 
which Marxists were pitted against neo-mercantilists in discussing the utility of the con-
tribution of Harold Innis’s staple theory for understanding the position of Canada in the 
imperialist chain. Marxist critiques highlighted the lack of understanding of the state, 
alienation, technology and the nationalist discourse that neo-mercantilist ‘Innisians’ pro-
moted (e.g. McNally 1981; 1986; Panitch 1981). We illustrate how these critiques are 
valid with reference to the neo-mercantilist treatment of key developments in the history 
of Icelandic capitalism, which are either glossed over or misrepresented in this literature. 
Fundamental to these is the essentialisation of the micro-scale of the Icelandic political 
economy. Iceland’s geographical smallness is a running theme in neo-mercantilist analy-
sis, which drives clientelist corruption, renders alienation and technological develop-
ments a national blessing, and yet turns the nation-state into an ultimately useful agent 
in steering capitalist development. The country’s small size thus indirectly excuses the 
alienation and exploitation of labour. We therefore seek to redress the neglect of the 
social struggle at the core of capitalist development in Iceland.
This said, we do not suggest that nationalism, national identity and the size of the 
economy are irrelevant in the analysis of Icelandic political economy. On the contrary, 
the analysis of nationalist discourse, national identity and scale should be fundamental 
to any understanding of hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. Independence 
from Denmark, its geostrategic location and the structural limitations of capitalist devel-
opment have rendered the fanning of nationalist fervour an attractive political strategy 
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(see Bergmann 2014a). Nevertheless, this must be understood in relation to social strug-
gle, and in relation to how it may detract from tensions in the wage-relation.
The paper is organised as follows. First, key aspects of the neo-mercantilist analysis of 
the Icelandic crisis against the backdrop of its political economy are summarised. This is 
followed by a critique of the neo-mercantilist approach in general, and an analysis of 
Iceland in particular. This critique draws on primarily three sources: Pradella’s critique of 
methodological nationalism (2014), Jessop’s ‘strategic relational’ theory (esp. 1990, 
2002) and McNally’s critique of technodeterminism (1981, 1986). It focuses on a few 
foundational accounts in the neo-mercantilist analysis: the turn to capitalism in Iceland, 
the role of technological development in Icelandic capitalist development, the represen-
tation of the cod wars with the United Kingdom from the 1950s to the 1970s, and the 
neoliberal restructuring of the fisheries sector. The paper, in third place, revisits these 
developments to retell the story by drawing on this critical political economy literature, 
and providing a substantial historical background. This, we assert, is essential for explain-
ing the premises underpinning the neoliberal accumulation strategy implemented to 
move away from dependence on fisheries products and towards financial markets, and 
thus supposedly stabilise capitalist accumulation. We also relate this to the construction 
of Icelandic neo-corporatism and the embedding of the labour movement in the finance-
dominated growth model (Macheda 2012), neglected by the neo-mercantilist analysis. 
Without a historical materialist critique of the influential neo-mercantilist analysis of the 
Icelandic crisis, labour in Iceland may be encouraged to approach strategy-building from 
a nationalist perspective that obscures the historically specific problems it faces in the 
Icelandic political economy (cf. McNally 1991).
The dominant account of the Icelandic crisis
This section outlines key aspects of the dominant analysis of the Icelandic crisis, examin-
ing the neo-mercantilist critique of neoliberalism, the latter’s fascination with financial 
markets, and the cronyism that often goes with privatisation. This analysis attributes 
particular characteristics and significance to Icelandic nationalism in telling this story. 
Historicising the crisis, it seeks to set out the premises for the neoliberal accumulation 
strategy implemented in the early 1980s to move away from dependence on fisheries 
products, and towards financial markets. The analysis highlights clientelist corruption, 
made out to be the key factor in the development of the finance-dominated growth 
model in the Icelandic case. The small size of Icelandic society is deemed to be a central 
reason for why clientelist corruption has become so widespread in Iceland, a phenome-
non particularly evident in the creation of this growth model. Drawing on an analogy 
with the fate of Icarus in Greek mythology, Robert Wade (2009) tells a story of Icelanders 
in hubris attempting to create the means to escape the island economy’s structural limita-
tions of size and isolation by ambitiously pursuing a finance-oriented growth model. 
However, ignoring warnings of its unsustainability, they kept going until they, along 
with their growth model, crashed.
The neo-mercantilist analysis tells a story of pre-neoliberal 20th-century Icelandic 
capitalism as one of romantic liberation. In an ironic twist, while intended as a critique 
of neoliberalism, this story resonates strongly with the same dominant nationalist 
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discourses in Iceland that have, post-crisis, obscured the social struggle at the heart of the 
current situation – the same struggle which neoliberal social forces so successfully mar-
ginalised with nationalist rhetoric and the consumerist lures of financialisation. The 
story of liberation (Wade 2009: 8-11; see also Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir 2010: 9-12) is 
a ‘rags to riches’ tale, highlighting Icelandic capitalism’s origins in the emancipation from 
feudalist social relations of quasi-peonage under the Danish King in the early 20th cen-
tury. Feudal landlords, reluctant to allow farmers to find fishing-related jobs in towns, 
limited fishing to a seasonal activity and held technological development back to confine 
fishing to open rowing boats. At the turn of the 20th century, Icelanders were amongst 
the poorest in the region, isolated from world markets. As ‘big, engine-powered boats’ 
were introduced, new occupations, primarily fishing-related, in coastal villages and 
towns were ‘opened up’. Feudal landlords and the administrative class were unable to 
prevent workers from flooding ‘out of the countryside’. This gave Icelanders the impetus 
to gain sovereignty in 1918, and eventually independence in 1944. The independence 
gained ‘from landlords and from other countries’ became a powerful source of identity in 
Iceland, filling a rich literature that was enabled by high levels of literacy. A sense of 
uniqueness came into being, giving Icelanders a strong sense of national pride that has 
been evoked in political discourse ever since (see Bergmann 2014b). It has also been a 
driving force in making Iceland a highly affluent economy on a par with its Nordic 
brethren. In other words, the pace of technology and the birth of nationhood has driven 
Iceland’s catch-up. Ultimately, Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir (2010: 10) link this to the 
creation and temporary success of the finance-dominated growth model: becoming one 
of the richest countries in the world allowed Icelanders ‘to see themselves as “independ-
ent people” at last’. They also confidently, perhaps even arrogantly, portrayed themselves 
as such in the international arena. This sense of confident independence, buttressed by 
credit-enabled consumerism and low unemployment, blinded Icelanders to the dangers 
of allowing the financial sector to outgrow GDP at a rate of 10 to 1, and of the cronyism 
that enabled it with only a small currency and tax base, yet liberalised capital controls 
(Wade 2009: 14-15). Ultimately, however, this affluence, sense of independence and 
international confidence came crashing down as the three big banks’ liabilities became 
untenable for the Central Bank, the IMF became involved, and capital controls were 
erected. Indeed – and this is perfectly in line with the neo-mercantilist approach – Wade’s 
(2009: 16-17) story asserts the ‘phoniness’ of Icelandic catch-up and, quoting the neo-
liberal ideologue Milton Friedmann, asserts that Icelanders were enjoying a free lunch, 
when there is no such thing. Neoliberal forces set free a ‘finance capital’ fraction, spon-
soring it by building a growth model around it. This came at the expense of an industrial 
fraction and entrepeneurialism. However, the growth model’s capacity to bring about 
catch-up remains limited by Iceland’s dependency position.
Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir (2010: 12) draw attention to the manner in which crony-
ism played a central role in this story, particularly in the creation of the three big private 
banks whose high degrees of debt leverage eventually were deemed unsustainable by 
markets and foreign depositors. The small size of the country structurally promotes cor-
ruption. As Wade (2009: 25) puts it elsewhere (with regard to the civil service), ‘Iceland’s 
small size means that nepotism, patron-client obligations, and cronyism (friends of 
friends) are constant dangers in civil service recruitment and promotion.’ At the same 
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time, compared with some other contexts ostensibly structurally inclined to corruption, 
he claims that Iceland’s neopatrimonial bureaucracy has functioned well due to high 
levels of human capital (Wade 2009: 26). Indeed, it is this relative superiority of ‘human’ 
or ‘mental’ (as in the work of original neo-mercantilist Friedrich List) capital that has 
made Iceland relatively successful vis-a-vis other microeconomies in catching up with the 
core capitalist economies (cf. Pradella 2014: 190).
Yet Wade considers the bank privatisation of 1998 to have been a process too chal-
lenging for this bureaucracy. Neoliberal politicians and ideologues in the Independence 
Party along with their coalition partners in the Progressive Party handed over control of 
public financial institutions to their grandees in ‘cronyist fashion’. These new owners 
were not only inexperienced but also highly ambitious, bringing them to set up a num-
ber of private-equity firms pursuing investments beyond the ‘normal’ national confines 
of Icelandic business activity. The same politicians and ideologues who presided over this 
handover of financial power also took on the roles of these financial institutions’ regula-
tors and supervisors without much, if any, experience of financial market governance. 
Until 2006 and the so-called ‘Geyser crisis’, in which speculative flows targeted Iceland, 
the growth model generated impressive GDP growth (of around 8 per cent, at its peak 
in 2004). Flying high on a strong sense of post-colonial nationalism, common Icelanders 
sucked up this success to the extent that neither the Geyser crisis nor subsequent squeaks 
in the growth model sparked public concern. To calm any jitters among foreign inves-
tors, a series of high-profile economists and regulators were mobilised to testify to the 
health of the growth model. In the end, this dangerous concoction of cronyism, ambi-
tion, inexperience and nationalism brought the growth model to its knees. Yet corrup-
tion is the standout factor – a factor linked to the microscopic size of Icelandic economic 
and society.
In the next section, we turn to our critique.
The neo-mercantilist analysis of the Icelandic crisis: 
A critical political economy critique
This section critiques the neo-mercantilist approach in general, and the analysis of 
Iceland in particular. The critique draws primarily on three sources: Pradella’s critique of 
methodological nationalism (2014), Jessop’s ‘strategic relational’ approach (esp. 1990, 
2002; Jessop & Sum 2006), and geographical and technological determinism (McNally 
1981, 1986; Panitch 1981). We focus our attention on a few foundational accounts in 
the neo-mercantilist analysis: the turn to capitalism in Iceland; the role of technological 
development in Icelandic capitalist development; the representation of the cod wars with 
the United Kingdom from the 1950s to the 1970s; and the neoliberal restructuring of 
the fisheries sector and the latter’s role in the construction of the finance-dominated 
growth regime.
Tracing the foundations of the work of contemporaries Robert Wade and Ha-Joon 
Chang to the work of 19th century Prussian advisor Friedrich List, Pradella (2014) dem-
onstrates how methodological nationalism in neo-mercantilism is founded on the con-
flation of society with the state and national territory. She asserts that in determining 
national economic performance, internal and external factors are isolated and separated, 
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with precedence afforded to the former. The nation-state is an organic whole and the 
unit of analysis. This means that the effects of the international order and the internal 
factors, other than state policy, are downplayed. The state is not merely left undefined, 
but is assumed to be autonomous from society. This sets up a dualism not merely between 
state and market, but also between the national and international. The ‘complex rela-
tions between the national and the international dynamics of capital accumulation’ are 
thus oversimplified, not least by ignoring the significance of social and political move-
ments in the process of making economic policy (Pradella 2014: 190-191). In the words 
of Desai (2012: 62), ‘as a spokesperson for a capitalist developmental state List was not 
concerned about class exploitation, only national exploitation’. In Marx’s critique of List, 
what the individual bourgeois calls his nationality is the community of interest shared 
with other bourgeois inside the country, and directed against the proletariat inside, and 
the bourgeois outside the country (Marx 1975 [1845]: 281). This ‘double standard’ 
resurfaces in the neo-mercantilist recognition of class exploitation within domestic bor-
ders, as it abolishes the ‘exchange values’ outside the country.
While attributing significance to labour exploitation in economic growth, broader 
social and political processes are thus not incorporated in neo-mercantilist analysis. 
Indeed, the state is in the last instance considered benign. As cronyism, clientelism and 
corruption blur the distinction between autonomous state and civil society, these prac-
tices become the primary targets of critique. Ironically, because neoliberal restructuring 
is typically its target of critique, these premises, Pradella accurately demonstrates (2014: 
181-182), are very similar to those of neoliberalism. As we have already seen, cronyism, 
clientelism and corruption play central parts in the neo-mercantilist analysis of the 
Icelandic crisis.
While attractive to the nationalist left and neoliberals alike, from the vantage point of 
the Marxist theory of the capitalist state as articulated by Jessop (1990; 2002), the neo-
mercantilist focus on corruption is only of limited value. Here, the assumption of relative 
autonomy renders the state in capitalism in particular ways already ‘captured’, although 
only by capital in general, and affording workers with rights and duties that distract 
them from their sense of collectivity deriving from exploitation of surplus value. Indeed, 
the capitalist state is structurally inscribed to reproduce capitalism. At a high level of 
abstraction, the capitalist state plays a central role in régulation in the narrow sense by 
performing economic functions, and in the integral sense through its ethico-political and 
politico-military activities. It follows that political society thus has to make itself appear 
autonomous from civil society in order to reproduce its legitimacy. With regard to size, 
the small size of the country may make the density of networks that connect political and 
civil society greater, but there must still be a plausible pretense of autonomy in order to 
render the state, and capitalism with it, legitimate. This is arguably why the finding of 
elaborate corruption by the Icelandic Parliamentary Commission (Iceland 2010) inves-
tigating the crisis caused such shock and consternation in Icelandic society. However, in 
practice, that autonomy can only be relative because in order to secure its legitimacy, and 
thus its ability to secure basic resources (e.g. tax), the state must avoid appearing ‘arbi-
trary, rationalistic, and willed’ (Gramsci 1998: 377). Because the state’s own particular 
powers and resources, as well as liabilities, are produced outside the formal confines of 
the state apparatus, in wider civil society its powers are always relational and conditional. 
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Its protection of capitalist social relations overdetermines the state’s form in its institu-
tional separation from the economic space of valorisation. This gives it a ‘relative auton-
omy’ from civil society and economy, which prevents the state from appearing as a ‘class 
state’ (Jessop & Sum 2006: 367).
The capitalist state is mutually constitutive with the market economy (Jessop & Sum 
2006: 155). In order to regularise capitalist laws, the state must bring about ‘a structured 
coherence [ – a reciprocity –] between economic structure and the superstructures’ (Jessop 
& Sum 2006: 358), and the appearance of a system as ‘closed’ and self-reproducing 
(Krätke, in Jessop 2006: 162). The leading group must articulate particular economic 
interests as being of universal interest, and economic strategies in convincing accordance 
with the ‘decisive economic nucleus’ (Jessop & Sum 2006: 161). Political parties, key 
constituents of political society, represent these, but seek to avoid being perceived as 
directly associated with particular economic interests. Since the contradictions and dilem-
mas in the coordination of accumulation are insoluble in the abstract, they can only be 
resolved through the formulation and realisation of particular ‘accumulation strategies’ 
(Jessop & Sum 2006: 317). To be successful, an accumulation strategy must outline a 
mode of régulation. In times of crisis, in which modes of régulation no longer successfully 
stabilise accumulation, the accumulation strategies fail. To relegitimate capitalism, there-
fore, a new accumulation strategy must be formulated.
Yet the construction and delivery of accumulation strategies take place in a strategi-
cally selective context, reflected in the capitalist state’s ‘path-dependencies’. This means 
that it is structurally inscribed with a particular ‘strategic selectivity’ – a specific configu-
ration of ‘state branches, apparatuses and institutions … and institutional unities, and 
their specific patterns of domination and subordination’ (2006: 97-98). This produces 
the differential ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strate-
gies (Jessop 2002: 40). ‘State projects’ may, however, reconfigure strategic selectivities 
over time in order to shape the path-dependency of others (i.e. path-shaping, e.g. Jessop 
2009: 340). However, it is key to remember that the ‘state [itself ] does not exercise 
power, it is “peopled”’ (Jessop 1990: 366-7). Politicians and civil servants play temporary 
roles in its reproduction and transformation. Thus such a perspective examines how 
economic issues are translated into political problems for action by the state ‘in its inclu-
sive sense and … mediated by the structurally inscribed, strategically selective nature of 
political regimes’ (Jessop & Sum 2006: 372). As we will illustrate below, both the fish-
ing-dominated growth model of the immediate post-Second World War period and the 
finance-dominated growth model sought to safeguard corporate profits. As we will see 
further below, the Icelandic state played a crucial role in facilitating this. In search of 
deeper social régulation, accumulation strategies, at least partly and at times more exten-
sively, were devised so as to compensate for this compromise.
It is the case, no matter what, that nationalism is a key feature in any discourse seek-
ing to legitimate a regime of accumulation. Indeed, central to mediating antagonistic 
ideological and economic interests in the formulation and implementation of accumula-
tion strategies is the articulation of these interests in relation to longstanding or new 
hegemonic projects. Hegemonic projects are inherently nationalist, as is the case in 
Iceland. Nation projects often seek to unite populations through, for instance, the expan-
sion of the welfare state in the post-Second World War period. Also, common enemy 
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projects identify and target a common threat, a foreign enemy or hyper-inflation. As we 
will later see, nationalist discourse in Iceland has at different points in time been domi-
nated by both forms of hegemonic project (Jonsson 1993: 88).
Following on from the above critique of neo-mercantilism’s simplistic conception of 
the state, its account of the economy suffers from technodeterminism, and also fails to 
challenge the international system of exploitation that is capitalism, and to thus outline 
a perspective from which social and political movements can at least understand the 
challenge on their hands. This brings us back to debates between Marxists and leftist 
nationalists in Canada in the 1980s on the subject of the work of the influential Canadian 
political economist Harold Innis in inspiring an understanding of Canadian economic 
history and its position in the international order. Innis stipulated that within civilisa-
tional, and in this particular case, ‘capitalist’ development, the ‘periphery’ (Canada) 
receives its culture through trade with the metropole (the British-US core). Trade is here 
the stimulus to development, and it is the character of the staple product produced for 
export, especially its geographic and technological constitution, which determines pat-
terns of development and accompanying forms of social and political organisation in the 
periphery within Anglo-American ‘civilisation’: ‘each staple in its turn left its stamp, and 
the shift to new staples invariably produced periods of crisis in which adjustments in the 
old structure were painfully made and a new pattern created in relation to a new staple’ 
(Innis 2007: 24). The danger with Innis’s staple theory is the inherent tendency towards 
commodity fetishism in his work. This results from a technological determinism (or in 
Innis’s terminology, ‘technological situation’) and a geographical determinism (Innis’s 
‘geographic background’).2 The result, in McNally’s words, is ‘a conception of capitalist 
production as constituted by relations between things and culminating in the production 
of things’ (1981: 45).
The neo-mercantilist neo-Innisians of the 1970s (see Williams 1988), like Friedrich 
List before them, situated this analysis within the imperialist chain. They considered a 
change in staples to be not merely related to the requirements of international trade, but 
also conducive to repositioning within the imperialist chain. Typically, the merchant and 
finance fractions of capital benefited from this at the expense of the industrial entrepre-
neur with whom any limited hope for catch-up lay: the ‘maximization of the mercantile 
surplus will minimize the industrial surplus’ (Levitt, in Panitch 1981: 10). The financial 
fraction’s dominance, founded on the close historical relationship between local mer-
chants and the core, determined Canadian dependency. This class fraction kept the 
indigenous class of industrial entrepreneurs at bay, and sustained extensive exports of 
staple goods. This, in turn, brought about large-scale manufacturing by US multination-
als in Canada. The parallels, to which we will return, with the neo-mercantile analysis of 
Iceland are striking. They thus periodised Canadian history according to changes in 
external relations. Their Marxist critics challenged the manner in which this neo-mer-
cantilist analysis sets up a dependency geography of periphery-core, which is highly 
problematic for such an affluent country as Canada (Panitch 1981). While Iceland is a 
much smaller country than Canada, the two present similarities in their affluence, staple 
product reliance and geographic peripherality, which in turn are reflected in the neo-
mercantilist analysis of Iceland. Panitch’s (1981: 9) analysis of the neo-Innisian approach 
rings very true when considering the focus on the importation of trawler technology at 
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the turn of the 20th century in Iceland in Wade’s analysis: ‘importation of capital in this 
form is not the import of a thing, but of certain social relationships which are uncharac-
teristic of peripheral societies in the mercantile era’. This leftist nationalist approach is 
happy to conceive of strategies that bring the ‘dependent’ country to the core of the lib-
eral international order, so that it can benefit from it without consideration for exploita-
tive class relations.
As Panitch (1981: 9) states,
while the neo-mercantilist approach ignores class relations, from a Marxist perspective an 
appreciation of class relations of exploitation and struggle is essential to make sense of what is 
going on in a society and in relations between societies. Without this, one is forced to see 
development or underdevelopment entirely as the creation of international relations or of 
ruling classes or of reified organizations.
In the next section, we will account for key developments in the Icelandic political 
economy by doing just that.
Retelling the Icelandic story
We begin this section with an account of the origins of capitalism in Iceland. This is fol-
lowed by a setting out of the historical developments in the relationship between politi-
cal and civil society in Iceland. We then turn to an analysis of the fishing-dominated 
growth model in the post-Second World War period, as well as during its crisis in the 
1970s. Finally, and against this background, we analyse the significance of the introduc-
tion of fishing quotas in the 1980s for financialisation in the 1990s and 2000s.
Origins of capitalism in Iceland
Through the expansion of the fishing sector, Iceland’s late-emerging capitalism came to 
centre on a regime of extensive accumulation of absolute surplus value extraction. In the 
mid-19th century, Iceland played a limited part in the Danish empire and thus the mer-
cantile system as a whole. Urbanisation had hardly begun, and most people worked for 
food and lodging on family-run farms in the countryside. Neither was there any func-
tional monetary or other sort of financial system to underpin capitalist accumulation. A 
small number of farmers produced traditional food products, and the Danish monarch 
largely monopolised foreign trade. Capitalism’s relatively late emergence in Iceland was 
spurred by the Danish Crown’s promotion of Icelandic state-building and ambition to 
introduce capitalist accumulation throughout the empire, including Iceland. It sought to 
undermine the landowning class’s control over social and technical change (or rather, 
reluctance to allow for it) by undermining its power in the Althing (Iceland’s Parliament) 
in the run-up to sovereignty in 1918, and by gradually relaxing the Crown’s control over 
external trade from 1855, and thus promoting the rise of merchant and fisheries frac-
tions of the capitalist class. Limited imports had been financed by the Danish Crown. 
Now, capitalism and sovereignty required local commodities to be exchanged for foreign 
currency in order to pay for growing demands for imports.
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Commodification of land, labour and money brought urbanisation and domestic 
markets (Magnússon 1985). The Danish Crown representatives and the small merchant 
class with links to foreign capital, also referred to as ‘the industrialisers’, criticised the 
landowning class and its representatives, also known as ‘the preservationists’, for their 
traditional ideals of small-scale farming and artisanship (Baldvinsdottir 1998: 48-9). 
This provided the political space for the growth of foreign trade revolving around the 
fisheries sector. The ample fish stock, up to this point harvested seasonally and in open 
rowing boats to supplement nutrition, was the industrialisers’ target for commodifica-
tion. By importing basic trawler vessel technology and fish product processing equip-
ment, the industrialisers could make the argument for opportunities for scale and speed 
of production. Merchants could point to overseas market opportunities. Thus, fish and 
fish products could be made the central export commodity. This commodification of 
land was only possible if coupled with the commodification of labour. By challenging the 
quasi-feudal mode of production in place, large numbers of workers were able to break 
away from quasi-peonage agricultural labour relations in the countryside, and take up 
wage-labour in coastal towns. Fishermen’s income was based on a share of the catch, link-
ing their interests, in the early years, with those of the fishing vessel owners. The heavy 
class distinction in agriculture was thus less severe in the fisheries-based costal towns. 
The population of Reykjavik, the new hub of capitalist accumulation, grew from 10 per 
cent of the population in 1900 to 40 per cent in 1930. By the end of the 20th century, 
75 per cent of Iceland’s population had come to live in the greater Reykjavik area.
The commodification of money occurred through the creation of the Íslandsbanki 
(Bank of Iceland). In the 1890s, the Landsbanki (National Bank of Iceland) was set up 
to finance fishing capital and wages. However, it was soon found to be inadequate. 
Aiming at superseding the Landsbanki, local merchants and the Danish Crown came up 
with a series of proposals to enable the creation and flow of local currency. Following a 
struggle between industrialiser and preservationist forces, played out in the Althing, the 
former was able to push through the creation of the rather peculiar Íslandsbanki in 1902. 
Apart from being a privately owned, joint-stock central bank with the right to issue 
Icelandic króna against the Gold Standard, it was partly foreign-owned by Danish and 
British interests. Preservationists were, however, able to secure concessions on the size of 
the joint-stock, a reduction in the maturity of promissory notes, and the circumscription 
of Althing influence over the Bank (Snævarr 1993). Still, the creation of this mediating 
mechanism in the mode of regulation led to the transnationalisation of Icelandic capital 
accumulation, and was key to the accumulation strategy of the emerging industrialist 
fraction of capital, solidifying its ties to foreign capital (Baldvinsdottir 1999: 49). 
Through these developments, capitalist accumulation came to centre on a regime of 
extensive accumulation of absolute surplus value extraction through the expansion of the 
fisheries sector. A historic bloc was thus formed by an emerging bourgeoisie of merchants 
and industrial entrepreneurs, much of which would come to revolve around 14 families 
(popularly known as the ‘Octopus’, see Arnason 1991), and wage-labourers.
However, this bloc lacked solid support from a political party, and without this the 
bank’s ability to finance the transnationalisation of capital accumulation was under-
mined. In the 1920s, it was contested in the Althing by the ‘Preservationist’ parliamen-
tary alliance drawn from the Progressive Party, the Co-operative Movement and the 
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Social Democratic Party (which had been divided on its support of the bank). Developed 
around a common-enemy hegemonic project, this challenge represented the interests of 
a competing historic bloc also claiming to represent progress, albeit through innovation 
in agricultural production, to hinder the transnational capital from destroying small-
scale Icelandic production. The premise of their political project was the bank’s role in 
promoting industrialisation, and that foreigners should not have the right to hold shares 
in the bank. The bank was closed down in 1930 and replaced as Iceland’s central bank 
by the newly formed Landsbanki in 1928. The newly formed joint-stock Fisheries Bank 
of Iceland hf. took over Islandsbanki’s foreign debt, with the new central bank as major-
ity shareholder. Constituting a central element of the accumulation strategy of the farmer 
fraction of capital, the Agricultural Bank was set up in 1929 to provide loans to the 
agricultural sector. While both groups claimed to represent national progress, the com-
peting historic bloc made a more successful claim to defend the struggle for independ-
ence from the Danish Crown, which had become a hegemonic element of the Icelandic 
societal paradigm. Key outcomes were isolationism and a slowing down of 
industrialisation.
The Icelandic capitalist state
In contrast with neo-mercantilist analyses, we need to pay close attention to how politi-
cal society, constituted by political parties and the state apparatus, is historically inter-
twined with civil society in Iceland. While elite networks are dense and as such significant 
in Iceland (Baldvinsdottir 1998), we should be careful with assuming that micro-size 
makes for any particular infringement upon state autonomy. The capitalist state can 
merely be relatively autonomous. As such, we should never be surprised to see ‘deals’ 
being done between representatives of state and markets. This is a propensity within 
capitalism, not a matter of size. The state is not ultimately benign. It is what it is: a capi-
talist state, concerned with the reproduction of capitalism. This conception enables us to 
acknowledge the historically specific influence of capital on the state without turning the 
state into a mouthpiece of particular capitals. Such a simplistic understanding would also 
weaken our understanding of labour’s role in financialisation and in the creation of 
finance-oriented growth models (cf. Belfrage & Ryner 2009). This is thus essential for 
grasping how the social relations of production at the heart of Icelandic capitalist accu-
mulation were created and mediated.
The country’s political party system was taking shape in the early 20th century. Ever 
since, the system has consisted of four main parties (see Kristinsson 2006). Despite 
repeated attempts, efforts to break up this party of four have thus far failed. The main 
ruling parties, the Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn, IP) and Progressive Party 
(Framsóknarflokkurinn, PP) managed the Icelandic economy through most of the 20th 
century, heavily controlled by regulations, governmental licensing, and import and 
export controls. Most private firms were closely tied to the IP through the Employers 
Association, and the powerful Co-operative Movement was in effect the business branch 
of the Progressive Party. The Co-operative Movement controlled companies in most 
fields of the economy, and was for a while, because of its centrist organisation, the most 
influential player in the economy. This was branded ‘the rule of halves’ 
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(helmingaskiptareglan), which itself was partially broken when the Co-operative 
Movement collapsed in 1992. Emerging partly in response to the political fragmentation 
of industrial capital, the right-of-centre IP emerged as the largest political party and 
indeed the country’s hegemonic party throughout most of the century, following its crea-
tion in 1929. IP combined demands for a laissez-faire economy, in opposition to social-
ism and co-operativism, with demands for law and order that were often couched in 
nationalist discourse (Gudmundsson, in Baldvinsdottir 1999: 31). To disguise its class 
allegiances, the party claimed to harmoniously represent all classes, a claim captured 
discursively by its slogan ‘class with class’ (Kristjansson 1977) and practically by its com-
mitment to full employment via highly accommodating monetary policies. It routinely 
used currency devaluations to sustain profits (not wages), which led to inflation and the 
undermining of financial sector development (Jonsson 1993). It was closely linked with 
the Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA), including the Association of Fishing 
Vessel Owners (LÍÚ). The agricultural PP occupied the centre of Icelandic politics, and 
was often able to increase its importance by forming coalitions with both left and right.
The left wing in Icelandic politics failed, in contrast with its allies in the other Nordic 
countries, to overcome its tendential fragmentation in the 20th century. Trade unions 
emerged after the turn of the century with an established top-level organisation 
(Alþýðusamband Íslands, ASI). The Social Democratic Party (Alþýðuflokkurinn, SDP) 
was established in 1916 as the political arm of the ASI. However, the SDP was small by 
Scandinavian standards, and was dominated by a social-liberal faction, which welcomed 
individualism and the pursuit of wealth (Kristjánsson 1977). In 1930, a communist group 
split from the party, marking continued fragmentation in the coming decades. In the lat-
ter half of the century, the People’s Alliance (Alþýðubandalagið, PA) emerged as the united 
home of those on the left of the SDP. A one-nation strategy focused on welfare expansion 
and import substitution strategies promoting the fisheries sector was developed. The split 
was enhanced by foreign policy issues and the classical divide in Icelandic politics between 
internationalists and isolationists divided the left. While the SDP promoted participation 
in international organisations like NATO and the European integration project, the PA 
was more rooted in the heritage of the independence struggle and concerned with protect-
ing Iceland’s sovereignty against outside forces (Kristjánsdóttir 2008).
Attempts at uniting the left continued throughout the century. The latest serious 
attempt was made around the turn of the millennium with the merger of the SDP and 
the PA together with two satellite parties into the Social Democratic Alliance 
(Samfylkingin, SDA). In effect, however, the establishment of the Left Green Movement 
(Vinstri Hreyfingin – grænt framboð, LGM) undermined that attempt, which was 
almost instantly able to fill the space to the left of the SDA that the PA had previously 
occupied. Left-wing parties have played only a marginal role in the articulation of 
Icelandic hegemonic projects in the post-Second World War period, and as a conse-
quence, the welfare state never took the proportions of those found in some of the other 
Nordic states (Olafsson 2005).3
Through the Marxist conception of the capitalist state, we can make sense of the 
impact on the relationship between political and civil society of an economy’s position in 
the international order. This becomes highly relevant when considering accumulation 
strategies and hegemonic projects in relation to size. We will turn to this next.
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The fishing-dominated growth model and the Cod Wars
During the decades immediately following independence from Denmark in 1944 and 
the Second World War, extensive accumulation based on the fisheries sector resumed. As 
in its Nordic neighbours (see Katzenstein 1985), capitalist development in Iceland came 
to revolve around a heavily export-oriented regime of accumulation based on its rich but 
narrow range of natural resources. Despite food and staple goods being relatively disad-
vantaged under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), fungible fish 
products generated high profits. The industrial ‘Octopus’ fraction of capital (Kolgrabbinn), 
closely linked to the Independence Party, dominated many branches of the economy, 
including fishing, imports, petrol distribution, shipping and insurance, and held a 
monopoly on much of the country’s business with the US army base. It was able to gain 
some support from workers by expanding the workforce, mainly through feminisation 
and urbanisation, but also through its successful articulation of common enemy hegem-
onic projects. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, labour force participation 
was amongst the highest in Europe, with an unemployment rate averaging around 2 per 
cent. However, the success of IP had to do in no small part with the fragmentation of the 
labour movement. Since the 1940s, all political parties were represented in ASÍ, and 
labour leaders also wore different organisational hats, which may have tempered radical 
behaviour. In the wake of the Cod Wars of the 1950s and 1970s, in which Icelandic 
governments of all ranks were able to extend the country’s territorial waters and thus 
protect the interests relating to the export sector in relation to the British fishing indus-
try, the fast-growing fishing companies could introduce new forms of exploitation into 
accumulation by expanding and updating their trawler fleets. Fisheries came to generate 
the bulk of the country’s foreign income.
During the Cold War, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party were able to 
construct, exploiting the fragmented left, a common-enemy hegemonic project in rela-
tion to the Cold War. Aligning Iceland with the US and NATO, they could successfully 
articulate a position of ‘national interest’, navigating between internationalist and isola-
tionist interests. They were thus able to secure massive support through the US Marshall 
Aid Plan, and also to construe Iceland as an important, independent state in world poli-
tics by its becoming a founding member of NATO and joining the UN. In exchange for 
the right to set up a US base on land in Keflavik on the Reykjanes Peninsula close to 
Reykjavik, Iceland secured a bilateral defence agreement in 1951 as well as the opening 
up of the US market for Icelandic seafood products (Ingimundarson 1996). In its first 
decade, the military base accounted for up to 20 per cent of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings. Through politico-military moves, it was thus able to secure the eco-
nomic and financial basis to import new social relations of exploitation.
The close relationship with the USA enabled Icelandic governments to be more asser-
tive in relation to the British during the Cod Wars. In gradual steps, Icelandic govern-
ments unilaterally expanded the country’s exclusive fishing zone to 200 nautical miles. 
This politico-military move enabled Icelandic governments to displace internal ethico-
political challenges from both right and left by asserting sovereignty. The first confronta-
tion occurred in 1958, when the PP-PA government moved the zone from four to twelve 
miles. Foreign trawlers, mainly British, which for decades had been fishing close to 
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Iceland’s shores, were unhappy with the move. After repeated incidents of ramming 
between Icelandic patrol vessels and warships of the Royal British Navy, which had been 
called in to protect the British fishing trawlers, an agreement was reached. The British 
agreed to move out of the 12-mile zone in exchange for the Icelandic government’s agree-
ment to refer any further expansion to the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
(Jóhannesson 2006).
A second confrontation broke out in 1972 when the new left-wing government uni-
laterally announced an expansion to 50 nautical miles. The fisheries minister, Lúðvík 
Jósepsson (PA), justified his decision to abandon the previous agreement of the right-
wing government with the UK on the grounds that Iceland not only had the right but 
was also obligated to protect its economic independence (Jósepsson 1973). Despite this 
assertion, British trawlers kept on fishing within the 50-mile zone. Iceland’s coastguard 
responded by cutting the fishing nets from behind British trawlers. The government was 
able to claim that it served Iceland’s national interest that this confrontation between two 
NATO states at the height of the Cold War might weaken the organisation. Its Secretary 
General, Joseph Luns, was subsequently able to broker an agreement whereby fishing by 
British trawlers within Iceland’s 50-mile zone was limited to a small area.
The Cod Wars reached their height in 1975, when the IP-PP government announced 
an expansion to 200 miles (see Jóhannesson 2006). As before, the British trawlers refused 
to leave. The Icelandic coastguard thus resumed cutting their fishing nets. The British 
Navy could, of course, have intervened; however, the Icelandic government was able to 
leverage the significance attributed to the NATO base in Keflavik. By threatening to 
leave NATO and close its military base in Keflavik, thus opening up the North-West 
Atlantic to the Soviet Union, the Icelandic government was able to exploit its newly 
established Washington connection to secure its expanded maritime territory in interna-
tional law in 1976.
In the various political discourses employed by the different governments, the Cod 
Wars were articulated as a continuation of Iceland’s ‘eternal’ independence struggle, this 
time as a fight for economic independence against a foreign authority that had for over 
a century exploited Iceland’s natural resources. On the back of this historical struggle 
over Icelandic national resources, the strained relationship between Iceland and the UK 
during the Cod Wars were later to be re-articulated in the dispute over the Icesave deposit 
accounts in 2008.
Thanks to the vast expansion of the exclusive fishing zone during the Cod Wars, the 
fishing sector grew, which accelerated foreign income. This increased foreign currency 
inflows significantly. However, this also caused increased inflation, in the range of 30-50 
per cent annually. Indeed, fishing provided the only export industry of importance, consti-
tuting roughly 90 per cent of all merchandise exports in the early 1960s, making the social 
relations of production pertaining to the fishing sector absolutely central to the Icelandic 
political economy. Average annual aggregate GDP growth was 4 per cent for the following 
two decades, but this figure hides both the fact that profit rates were only secured by cur-
rency devaluations and the unpredictability of the annual size of harvests.
Translated into labour market relations, the narrow focus of the growth model created 
strategic selectivities that favoured fisheries capital. Emphasising Iceland’s microsize and 
reliance upon the revenue generated from fisheries exports, government economic policy 
Belfrage et al. 15
accommodated the demands of fishing capital in a context of price volatility. Monetary 
policy was kept lax to protect profit rates under the pretence that this also served workers 
in the fisheries sector. Repeated devaluations of the króna spurred inflation, with the 
effect that the population in effect came to live on a ‘share-of-the-catch income’ (Jónsson 
2009: 37).
Although the labour movement had grown relatively large and did, for instance, 
engage in collective wage bargaining, and successfully defended full employment, it was 
fragmented and its interests were ineffectively channeled into parliamentary politics. 
Indeed, the labour movement never succeeded in establishing common ground with 
employers, which could serve as the foundation for relatively peaceful labour relations, 
as, for example, in Sweden. Emerging partly in response to the political weakness of 
industrial capital, the Independence Party took advantage of this fragmentation by rep-
resenting itself as a defender of the interests of both capital and workers.
Successfully claiming to harmoniously represent all classes, the IP weakened the 
labour movement’s ability to push for any compromise-based incomes policy, which 
could have enabled the reinvestment of profits into labour and technology to ensure 
social protection and competitiveness. Iceland’s construction of a comprehensive and 
universalist welfare state unfolded at best unevenly during the period, and was able nei-
ther to provide effective wage protection against the effects of small annual harvests, nor 
to reduce inequality (Ólafsson 2005; Mjøset 1987). Aside from health policy and educa-
tion, Iceland’s economy could hardly be seen as redistributive. The growth model thus 
remained focused on extensive accumulation of absolute surplus value extraction, and 
developed a strong procyclicality. This, however, started to change with the destabilisa-
tion of international monetary relations and price levels in the late 1960s.
The crisis of the fishing-dominated growth model
As prices on fish products rose, the pressure on the growth model and the social relations 
of accumulation underpinning it were amplified. In accordance with the mechanisms of 
addressing pressure in the growth model, the resulting profit surge was not effectively 
channeled into productive investments, thus preventing excessive inflationary pressure, 
but was rather used to offset growing (albeit not internationally deviating) wage demands. 
This became a fundamental problem for the growth model once demand stagnated and 
fishing stocks collapsed in the 1970s. Governments from across the political spectrum 
were troubled in dealing with this inherent weakness. The economy slowly stagnated as 
foreign investment, more plentiful during and immediately in the wake of the Second 
World War, seized up (Mjöset 1987).
Social Democratic participation in government in the late 1960s led to the introduc-
tion of wage indexation, which resulted in wages partly following profit rates. Although 
labour-market conflict was avoided, public indebtedness and inflation kept on growing. 
With the OPEC oil shock in 1973, stagflationary pressures in the world economy caused 
disarray, as demand for fish products slumped. Profit rates fell, public indebtedness grew, 
and inflation once again shot up. The government responded to demands from fisheries 
capital to defend profit rates by dropping wage indexation and repeatedly devaluing the 
króna to strengthen the distribution of income transfers towards the fisheries sector 
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(Mjøset 1987). The government, however, failed to reverse the accommodating mone-
tary policies, with public indebtedness and inflation remaining high. As the subsequent 
resumption of growth in the economy, benefitting the fisheries sector in particular, was 
understood to come on the back of unfair income transfers, an unprecedented wave of 
strikes hit the country, lasting from 1974 to 1977. Radical dissent against this rentier 
capitalism (Gylfason 2006), as well as the societal paradigm underpinning it, resulted in 
unprecedented support for the SDP and the more radical leftist People’s Alliance in the 
1978 elections.
Each of the three state banks was closely connected to a political party: Landsbanki (or 
Landsbankinn) to the Independence Party; the Agrarian Bank (Búnaðarbanki Íslands) to 
the Progressive Party; and the People’s Bank of Iceland (Alþýðubanki Íslands) to the Social 
Democratic Party. Inflation had been common in the economy throughout most of the 
century, causing great difficulties. During the inflationary period of the 1970s and 1980s, 
real interest rates were kept negative as the nominal rate was kept below a fixed ceiling. 
Government-controlled banks issued loans according to nepotistic principles, financed by 
an inflation tax on deposits and other monetary assets. Consequently, savings rates fell and 
deposit installments shrank, rendering the financial system unsustainable (Halldórsson & 
Zoega 2010). However, it also brought about a large percentage of dwellings being pri-
vately owned, since the paying back of mortgages could be done more easily. Through these 
mechanisms, home-owning became an important part of the societal paradigm, and was 
often drawn upon in the construction of hegemonic projects and in the justification of 
accumulation strategies. As a part of a broad-based economic reform, this led the 
PP-SDA-PA government in 1979 to introduce an innovative mechanism of inflation 
indexation on bank loans, which soon became standard lending practice across the finan-
cial sector. Debtors were to pay fixed interest rates, but the costs of inflation would be 
added to the principal, which as a result would grow with inflation throughout the matu-
rity of the loan. As a result, the lion’s share of bank loans in the system would gradually 
become immune to changes in short-term policy rates. The equity of households, however, 
became immensely sensitive to inflation, greatly affecting the home-owning proportion of 
the population. Significantly, this creation of sensitivity to inflation through home-owner-
ship came to play a fundamental role in the financialisation of the 1990s and 2000s.
Neoliberalism, fisheries quotas and financialisation
Without paying sufficient attention to the causes of the crisis of the fishing-dominated 
growth model in the 1970s, the neo-mercantilist analysis, as we have seen, fails to see 
crucial missing links between its decline, the rise of neoliberalism and financialisation: 
that is, the way monetarist ideas informed the articulation of a new accumulation strat-
egy, and how the labour movement was incorporated into a new historic bloc by giving 
it a key role in managing financialisation.
The crisis of the 1970s provided the space for the emergence of a neoliberal faction 
within the IP. Within the IP, a generational shift was occurring, and young neoliberals 
rose through the ranks around the journal The Locomotive (Eimreiðin). Inspired by liber-
tarian and monetarist ideas, this new generation targeted a revamp of the foundations of 
the regime of accumulation. Influenced by neoliberal economists like James M. 
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Buchanan, Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, who all visited the country in the 
1980s, private property was to be given a new injection of life, as secured by a monetarist 
policy framework of anti-inflation, and supported by financial markets capable of effi-
ciently allocating resources. The promotion of private property and financial markets 
was also intended to support the diversification of the economy.
IP governments after the 1983 elections were significantly influenced by the neo-
liberal Locomotive Group’s agenda, and set out first and foremost to fight inflation 
through raising interest rates and weakening special interests, particularly labour. The 
devaluation of the króna as a regulatory mechanism was now deemed unacceptable. 
Instead, strong private property rights and financial market liberalisation were empha-
sised since such steps, it was argued, provided incentives for efficient market behav-
iour. Central to the formulation of this accumulation strategy was the commodification 
of land with the introduction of the regulatory system of Individual Transferable 
Quota (ITQ).
After the Cod Wars, the pressure on the harvesting of fish rose rapidly. Initially, this 
brought greater export revenue. However, it soon resulted in a decline in fish stocks. 
Inspired by the new neoliberal faction, the right-of-centre government sought to intro-
duce a quota system based on dividing the total allowable catch between fish vessel 
owners, and allowing for the trading of fishing rights. The design was such as to hand 
open-ended fishing rights to those fishing vessel owners who had exploited the stock 
in the few previous years. This move instantly created massive equity for those who 
happened to have been fishing in Icelandic waters during the selected period. While 
they were formally not their private property, fishing vessel owners could nevertheless 
freely trade fishing rights. This was based on the argument that fishing rights ‘should 
be developed as far as possible into a system of private property rights’ (Gissurarson 
2000).
While the shift to the finance-dominated growth model was not institutionalised 
until after the turn of the 21st century, the introduction of the ITQ system was crucial 
to its emergence. By turning uncaught fish into property rights, the very right to har-
vest and all its derivatives were made tradable. In addition to doing away with overfish-
ing, this was intended to incentivise optimal efficiency in the fisheries sector. In broad 
accordance with Chicago School principal-agent theory, inefficiently employed capac-
ity would now be appropriated. This was supported by the 1985 deregulation of the 
stock exchange, which enabled fishing firms to float its stocks and reorganise in accord-
ance with shareholder value ideas of corporate governance. On the back of commodi-
fication of unruly land, secure property rights and efficient corporate governance 
would break the boom-and-bust nature of the fisheries cycle. While anti-monopolistic 
in the abstract (Gissurarson 2000), strong oligopolistic tendencies were inscribed into 
the ITQ system. By playing into hands of the ‘giants’ in the Icelandic fisheries sector, 
further opportunities were created for fisheries capital to separate ownership from 
actual fishing through the construction of a leasing system. While ostensibly intended 
to generate competition, the ITQ system provided a strong mechanism for the cen-
tralisation of capital.
There was significant resistance to the introduction of the ITQ system. First, the 
market mechanisms set in motion by the ITQ system were criticised for fundamentally 
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transforming the power distribution in production relations to the benefit of fisheries 
capital, at the expense of labour. Equal wages across the fisheries sector was fundamen-
tally undermined as wages became increasingly determined by the market prices of 
different fish, the size of the annual catch, trade quotas and oil prices. This also pro-
foundly undermined solidaristic wage-bargaining. The distribution of quotas on the 
basis of catch history was also criticised. This related to the principle of distribution, 
which allocated quotas to vessel owners rather than to fishermen. Fishing rights, it was 
argued, were ‘traditionally the birth right of all Icelanders, but would now be inherited 
by the holders’ descendants like any other privately owned item’ (Helgason & Palsson 
1997). Blind pursuit of profit of the fisheries capital from the commodification of 
uncaught fish was also criticised, and even deemed ‘immoral’. However, these criti-
cisms were partly mitigated by the accommodation of the SDP’s insistence upon the 
insertion of the first article in the Fisheries Management Act, stating that the fish 
stocks are ‘the common property’ of the Icelandic nation (Gissurarson 2000). Yet, in 
practice, this became more a symbolic act than an act with any real consequence.
Over-fishing was not instantly corrected with the introduction of the quota system, 
leading eventually to a collapse of the cod stock in 1989. The left-of-centre government 
responded by devaluing the króna. As before, the result was a sharp increase in inflation. 
The damaging effects suggested that the ITQ system had not had the desired effect. This 
time, however, for the purpose of promoting stability in the economy, the government 
did not compensate wage-earners for the currency devaluation, and in addition, it was a 
left-of-centre government administering the policy response. The government froze sala-
ries, reducing purchasing power significantly in the process.
From this hardline position, the left-of-centre government was able to negotiate a 
historic neo-corporatist agreement referred to as the ‘National Consensus Agreement’ 
(Þjóðarsáttin) with most labour market stakeholders, including all major employers and 
labour unions in 1990. This aimed at breaking the vicious cycle of wage increases eaten 
up by inflation. Attaining the support of a potentially destabilising labour movement 
(ASI) was here essential. In the crisis years, the labour movement had come to accept the 
longstanding position of the right that inflation was caused by wage demands, and not 
by employers demanding that profit rates should be preserved. Moreover, with the left-
of-centre government turning against the already fragmented labour movement, there 
was no meaningful political representative providing an alternative to the ASI. It was 
thus open to being incorporated into the new growth model. This was done by making 
it jointly responsible, in a tripartite system, for the management of Iceland’s substantial 
occupational pension funds. This also rendered it inclined to support the growth of the 
financial sector, not least since the latter was already firmly positioned at the centre of the 
widespread aim of diversifying the economy and breaking the inflationary procyclicality 
of the old model. With wage growth restricted, demands for high returns on pension 
savings were considerable. This contributed to bringing the ASI around to adopting 
portfolio management principles of investment (Macheda 2012). This was later inscribed 
into the funded element of the new pension system, introduced at the turn of the mil-
lennium. As such, the labour movement not only came to accept the neo-corporatist 
compromise of the early 1990s, but also came to play a significant role in promoting 
financialisation in the 1990s.
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Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the irony – in some ways understandable, considering the 
weakness of labour in Iceland – of the fact that neo-mercantilist analysis dominates the 
commentary on the Icelandic crisis. Its references to nationalism, corruption and essen-
tialist claims relating to the scale of the Icelandic economy are central to its account of 
the Icelandic crisis. Relatedly, its foundational methodological nationalism and techno-
determinism obscure the fictitiousness of land, labour and money as commodities. This 
is profoundly debilitating of the efforts of social and political movements to draw atten-
tion to neoliberal restructuring of social relations of production, and the use of this to 
fuel counterhegemonic social struggle. Having critiqued the neo-mercantilist analysis of 
the Icelandic political economy and crisis, we proceeded by reconceptualising key 
moments in the history of capitalist development in Iceland. In this reconceptualisation, 
we do not move away from analysing nationalism and national identity, but rather seek 
to draw attention to it as a fundamental element of hegemonic projects, central to the 
legitimation of accumulation strategies. This becomes, arguably, all the more relevant in 
times of crisis such as those experienced in Iceland today.
Finally, we believe that this study brings attention to questions that warrant further con-
sideration. How much does the scale of a national economy matter in determining history 
as a process made by human beings, albeit in circumstances not chosen by themselves? In 
other words, in what ways are nationalism and economic scale structurally related? More 
research should be conducted into this issue for the sake of empowering workers in small 
and microeconomies, too often taken advantage of and too often blinkered by nationalist 
discourses and rapid technology shifts (Berry 2011, 2015). Icelandic political economy 
promises to provide a telling case for exploring this issue, not least in relation to the crisis. 
Neoliberalism sought to overcome the procyclical ‘boom and bust cycle’ of the Icelandic 
monosectoral growth model through diversification, primitive accumulation, commodifica-
tion and financialisation. Triggered by developments in international political economy, this 
eventually brought about the Icelandic crash. This in turn required the introduction of capi-
tal controls. With the financial sector part dismantled and part-nationalised, the question 
arising is whether these capital controls do more than prevent the fall of the Icelandic cur-
rency and resulting inflation. Did financialisation in Iceland merely relocate inflationary 
pressures to the financial sector? Would their removal therefore unleash procyclical tenden-
cies in other sectors, not least in fisheries? The questions arising are many and worrying. 
Would going against IMF conventions, perhaps, and keeping capital controls for this micro-
economy provide the platform for Icelandic labour to assert itself, and thus acquire a greater 
degree of control of the political economy? The point is, however, that any such accumula-
tion strategy must be premised on an understanding of capitalism as an international system 
of exploitation of labour. If it is not, it is likely to be hijacked by a ‘common enemy’ hegem-
onic project. Whether this would be founded on neoliberalism or neo-mercantilism is of less 
importance. Either is ultimately to the long-term detriment of workers.
Notes
1. Wade (2009) and Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir (2010) are respectively the second and fourth 
most cited journal articles solely focused on the Icelandic crisis.
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2. In fact, Innis himself discussed Iceland quite extensively in his 1940 book, The Cod Fisheries: 
The History of an International Economy. In his analysis, technodeterminism and geographical 
determinism are clearly on display (see e.g. p. 472).
3. In addition to these four main parties, a fifth and sometimes also sixth party have temporarily 
occupied seats in Parliament. The longest surviving of these extra parties was the Women’s 
List (Kvennalistinn), which was represented in Parliament between 1983 and 1999, until 
it merged with others into the SDA. The 2013 parliamentary election saw two new parties 
emerging, a centrist liberal party Bright Future and an Icelandic version of the international 
Pirate Party.
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